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The purpose of this paper is to explore the similarities between Post Keynesian Economics (PKE) 
and Regulation Theory (RT). It is argued that, despite important differences between these 
traditions, the analytical contents of PKE and RT display broad similarities with respect to their 
treatments of the income-generating process, the crisis-prone nature of capitalism, and the 
institutional contingency of capitalist growth and development. This thesis is then exemplified 
and substantiated with reference to the 2007—2009 financial crisis and “Great Recession”. 
Specifically, it is shown that important strands of both PKE and RT characterize and were 
successful in anticipating the crisis as the result of the exhaustion of a financialized growth 
process. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to similarities between Post Keynesian 
Economics (PKE) and Regulation Theory (RT), and to use anticipations of the recent 
financial crisis and “Great Recession” in both literatures to exemplify these similarities.  
The approach taken does not involve exhaustive reviews of the PKE and RT 
literatures, but instead focuses on representative contributions that demonstrate the 
overlap between these traditions. Moreover, no pretence is made that there are not, in 
fact, obvious and important differences between PKE and RT. Indeed, well-known 
differences exist within the two traditions. Hence since Hamouda and Harcourt (1989) it 
has become common to refer to Marshallian (or American), Kaleckian and Sraffian 
“strands” within PKE that may display more or less coherence, while there exists a long-
standing distinction between the Parisian and Grenoble schools of RT and a distinction 
between RT as a whole and its sister school, the American Social Structure of 
Accumulation Theory (SSAT).
1
The project so-described is important for two reasons. The first is intellectual: 
exploring commonalities between traditions creates a basis for dialogue and hence for 
learning and advancement. The second is institutional: building institutions (including 
research centres and publication outlets) is essential to the success of heterodox 
economics (Palley, 1996, chpt.3). And this process of institution building requires 
 Nevertheless, by drawing on common themes within 
each tradition, the argument that follows will be that the analytical contents of PKE and 
RT display broad similarities, and that this theoretical overlap is exemplified by 
anticipations of the current crisis found in both the PKE and RT literatures. 
                                                 
1 On these distinctions within RT see, for example, Paquette (1999) for a primer. Note that in what follows, 
RT is defined broadly to include the contributions of SSAT. 2 
 
resources that interaction – and eventually, explicit cooperation and collusion – between 
broadly similar research traditions may help furnish. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins by drawing 
attention to some important differences between PKE and RT, before section 3 argues 
that each of these differences can ultimately be seen to give way to a broad congruity 
between the two traditions. Section 4 argues that this congruity is reflected in the 
literatures that both PKE and RT produced prior to the onset of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis and Great Recession, which anticipate the crisis as a product of the long boom that 
preceded it. Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. On the Differences between PKE and RT 
Some authors associated with either PKE or RT have gone to lengths to 
emphasize the differences between these traditions. For example, Cornwall and Cornwall 
(2001, chpt. 5) contrast their evolutionary Keynesian account of the dynamics of post-war 
capitalism with both RT and SSAT. It is therefore prudent to begin by acknowledging 
some potential sources of disagreement between PKE and RT. Two such sources are 
discussed in this section: the basic “mechanics” of the income generating process; and the 
nature of aggregate fluctuations in economic activity. 
 
i) The income-generating process 
The roots of RT lie in Classical (Marxian) analysis. The following two-equation 
system provides a stylized description of the dynamics of the income-generating process 
that is consistent with the Classical tradition: 3 
 
        g sr π =             [1] 




≡−            [2] 
where g denotes the rate of accumulation, sπ is the propensity to save out of profits, r is 
the rate of profit, v is the full capacity capital-output ratio, w is the real wage and k is the 
capital-labour ratio. Equation [1] relates the rate of growth to the rate of profit, while 
equation [2] defines the rate of profit as the surplus of real output per unit of capital over 
and above total wages per unit of capital. Substituting [2] into [1] yields: 





 = −  
          [3] 
where g
* denotes the equilibrium rate of growth. In PKE, meanwhile, the dynamics of the 
income-generating process are exemplified by the following stylized Kaleckian analysis:
2
       
 
u g gu γ = +             [4] 




=              [5] 




=             [6] 
where u denotes the rate of capacity utilization, π is the profit share of income, and all 
other variables are as previously defined. Equation [4] describes the rate of accumulation 
as a function of capacity utilization, while equation [5] is often referred to as the 
Kaleckian “pricing” equation (since the profit share, π, is understood to be determined by 
                                                 
2 Other “strands” of PKE would describe the income generating process somewhat differently. For 
example, Kaldorians would emphasize the fundamental role of international trade in determining the rate of 
growth (see, for example, McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994). The Kaleckian model is privileged here by 
virtue of the ease with which it facilitates comparison and contrast with the stylized Classical system in 
equations [1] and [2]. This involves no great loss of generality, as will become clear in the following 
section. 4 
 
the mark up established by firms in the determination of prices). Finally, equation [6] is 
simply the inverse of equation [1], describing the rate of profits as a function of the rate 
of growth. Substitution of [6] into [5] and the result into [4] now yields the equilibrium 
rate of growth: 












          [7] 
Equations [3] and [7] illustrate two important differences between the Classical and 
Kaleckian descriptions of the income generating process. Hence note that it follows from 
[3] that: 








          [8] 
and (for economically meaningful values of r): 








          [9] 
Meanwhile, it follows from [7] that: 















      [10] 
given that  1 wa π = − where a denotes the labour-output ratio, and: 













        [11] 
In other words, the Classical and Kaleckian conceptions of the income-generating process 
suggest that the latter is either: profit-driven (an increase in the real wage squeezes profit 
and reduces growth, as in [8]) and supply-led (saving creates capital creates growth, as in 
[9]), as in the Classical tradition; or wage-driven (an increase in the real wage increases 
aggregate demand and hence capacity utilization and hence growth, as in [10]) and 5 
 
demand-led (saving reduces demand reduces growth, as in [11]), as in the Kaleckian 
tradition. 
 
ii) Long waves versus phases of economic growth 
As befits its Classical foundations, an important theme in RT is that of crisis. The 
recurrence of periodic minor crises, associated with business cycle recessions, is 
acknowledged, but of greater interest are less frequent major crises that can perturb the 
institutional foundations of the mode of regulation. The occurrence of these major crises 
is often associated with an explicitly cyclical view of long run capitalist growth and 
development – specifically, the notion that capitalism is characterized by Kondratieff or 
long waves with a period of approximately 4-5 decades (see, for example, Gordon et al, 
1982, chpt.2). 
PKE, meanwhile, is traditionally associated with short run analysis. But the project of 
extending Keynesian analysis to the long run is well established (see, for example, the 
various survey essays on Keynesian growth theory in Setterfield, 2010a). And although 
much of the analysis associated with this project revolves around the comparative static 
properties of steady state equilibrium solutions, the notion that the long run is 
characterized by aggregate fluctuations can be found in PKE. Hence, for example, 
Cornwall and Cornwall (2001) discuss alternating medium run episodes (lasting for two 
or more complete business cycles) of better and worse macroeconomic performance in 
their conception of long run dynamics.  
This having been said, the aggregate fluctuations in Cornwall and Cornwall (2001) 
bear greater resemblance to Maddison’s (1991) distinct but aperiodic phases of economic 6 
 
growth than a strict growth cycle. Indeed, Cornwall (1990, p.3) is explicitly critical of 
long wave analysis as an “inexorable mechanism” in which recovery inevitably follows 
decline. It is therefore tempting to conclude that RT displays a deeper and richer 
commitment to the notion that the long run is characterized by aggregate fluctuations, and 
that when PKE does move towards discussion of unsteady growth, the vision that 
emerges is distanced from the sort of explicitly cyclical interpretation of the long run that 
RT has shown a greater willingness to embrace. 
 
3. Transcending the differences: searching for the common core of PKE and RT 
The purpose of this section is to show that despite the differences between RT and 
PKE identified in the previous section, there exists a broad analytical congruity between 
the two traditions – one that is cemented by the importance that is attached in both 
traditions to the role of institutions in the functioning of a capitalist economy. 
 
i) The income-generating process again 
  Setterfield (2009) argues that the dynamics of the income generating process in 
both Classical and Keynesian economics can be summarized by a single canonical model 
of the form: 
p y qn ≡+            [12] 
qq =               [13] 
nn =               [14] 
        () y yZ =             [15] 
        ZZ =              [16] 7 
 
 
where y and yp are the actual and potential rates of growth (respectively), q is the rate of 
growth of labour productivity, n is the rate of population growth and the vector Z is a 
collection of variables associated with either the rate of growth of saving (as in the 
Classical tradition) or the level and/or rate of growth of autonomous demand (as in the 
Keynesian tradition). This system of equations admits solutions for two distinct growth 
rates. First, combination of [12]-[14] yields: 
p y qn = +            [17] 
Meanwhile, from [15] and [16], we get: 
        () y yZ =             [18] 
Equations [17] and [18] represent the natural and the actual (equilibrium) rates of growth, 
respectively. On the basis of these equations, we can then identify two different growth 
regimes that are common to all heterodox growth models (regardless of whether they are 
of a Classical or Keynesian genus). The first is a labour constrained (or, following 
Robinson (1956), “golden age”) regime, where y = yp. As is clear from [17] and [18], this 
regime will arise only if  () q n yZ += . In terms of the model specified above, this is an 
unlikely special case – but it may become a more general case if additional dynamics 
exist that cause q, n, or Z to adjust whenever this condition is not, at first, observed (on 
which see Setterfield, 2009). The second growth regime describes non-labour constrained 
or “dual” economies (Skott and Ryoo, 2008), where  p yy ≠ . In this regime, the first 8 
 
Harrod problem (the inequality of the actual and natural rates of growth) is observed, and 
the employment rate will be non-constant.
3
Of course, the synthetic model described above does not eliminate the basic 
differences between profit/supply-led growth and wage/demand-led growth identified 
earlier. But it does provide the opportunity to reinterpret these differences, as either: 
 
 
•  special cases of a general “non-neoclassical” conception of the income-generating 
process (as found, for example, in Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990); or 
•  a fulcrum for more specific debate over the mechanics of the growth process 
within a broadly common research programme – as in the debates about the 
behaviour of the actual and natural rates of capacity utilization between Duménil 
and Lévy (1999), and Lavoie (1995) and Dutt (1997) 
 
                                                 
3 This claim is straightforward to demonstrate. To begin with, note that the actual and potential levels of 
real output, Y and Yp, respectively, can be written as: 













where N denotes the level of employment and L the size of the labour force. It follows that: 
 
        y = q + e 
and: 
        yp = q + n 
 
where e is the rate of growth of employment. Hence in the presence of the first Harrod problem (i.e., 
when p yy ≠ ): 
        en ≠   
 
Finally, note that it follows from the definition of the employment rate, ε = N/L that: 
 
        ˆ en ε = − 
 
Hence if en ≠ , we must observe  ˆ 0 ε ≠  – i.e., a non-constant rate of employment. A corollary of this result 
is, of course, that  ˆ 0 p yy en ε = ⇒=⇒=, in which case the employment rate will be constant. 9 
 
Finally, and with specific reference to the similarities between RT and PKE (rather 
than Classical and Keynesian macroeconomics more generally), it is very important to 
note that RT is not characterized by unequivocal commitment to a Classical view of the 
income generating process. As Paquette (1999, p.968) notes, it is a distinguishing feature 
of the Grenoble school of RT that it is “rooted more heavily in Marxist theory”, while 
members of the Parisian school explicitly discuss problems associated with aggregate 
demand formation (see, for example, Mazier, 1998) and even adopt Keynesian 
descriptions of the income generating process that would be immediately familiar to Post 
Keynesian economists. Examples include the Kaldorian process of cumulative causation 
found in Boyer and Petit (1991) and Petit (1999), and the analytical model in Boyer 
(2000), central to which are the  demand-generating properties of wage formation and 
accelerator effects.
4
In sum, the question as to whether long run growth is wage-led and demand-
determined or profit-led and supply-determined is important, but need not (and should 
not) balkanize research in the RT and PKE traditions. 
 
 
ii) The nature of long aggregate fluctuations 
The critical issue here is whether the difference between long wave analysis and 
that based on Maddisonian “phases of economic growth” is, in fact, a difference of 
degree rather than one of kind? The answer is arguably in the affirmative. Hence note that 
                                                 
4 See also Milberg’s (2001) review of Mazier et al (1999), which compares the extensive and intensive 
accumulation regimes described in the latter to the exhilarationist/stagnationist dichotomy developed by 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), and also discusses the intellectual debt of the authors to Kaldor. 
Of course, it is quite possible to couch the possibility of aggregate demand failures in Classical 
language, by distinguishing the process of surplus value creation from its realization, from which arises the 
possibility of overproduction. But the argument here is that the Parisian school of RT goes beyond this, 
openly embracing both the rhetoric and analytical structures of explicitly Keynesian models. 10 
 
drawing on its Classical heritage, RT emphasizes that following a major crisis and the 
consequent breakdown of a previously prevailing mode of regulation, processes of social 
conflict and struggle are intrinsic to the forging of a new mode of regulation.
5
From this perspective, then, it can be argued that rather than having disparate 
visions of the long run, both RT and PKE share a common conception of capitalist 
growth as unsteady – i.e., subject to aggregate fluctuations. Hence the Classical heritage 
of RT leads inevitably to an emphasis on recurrent crises as a feature of the growth 
process. Meanwhile, although the use of steady-state equilibrium techniques sometimes 
masks this emphasis, the notion of unsteady growth and the potential for crises is evident 
in both key methodological (Kregel, 1976) and theoretical (Harrod, 1939; Minsky, 1978) 
contributions to PKE.  
 There is no 
reason to interpret such processes mechanistically. Indeed, conflict, interpreted as an 
open, non-deterministic process, can be seen as an important source of the fundamental 
uncertainty emphasized by PKE.  
It is also worth noting that emphasis on unsteady growth is in some sense 
important for the analytical structure of RT and PKE (rather than just their 
correspondence to reality). Hence referring back to the previous sub-section, unsteady 
growth helps make sense of the “dual” economy growth regime, where  p yy ≠  and the 
first Harrod problem prevails. This is because only the labour-constrained or “Golden 
Age” growth regime is strictly consistent with long run steady-state equilibrium 
conditions.
6
                                                 
5 This is true even for strict adherents of long wave analysis such as Gordon et al (1982). 
 
6 Essentially this is because the employment rate is bounded both above and below, so that the only rate of 
growth of the employment rate consistent with steady state equilibrium conditions is  ˆ 0 ε = . However, as 
demonstrated in footnote 3 above, whenever the first Harrod problem prevails, we will observe  ˆ 0 ε ≠ .  11 
 
 
iii) Emphasis on the institutional and historical contingency of capitalism 
  Finally, to the extent that a common emphasis on unsteady growth can be said to 
characterize RT and PKE, this points to a further point of comparison between these 
traditions. Specifically, the analysis of longer term aggregate fluctuations is qualitatively 
similar in both traditions, in the sense that it involves emphasis on the role of institutions 
in structuring the accumulation process. 
The notion of a mode of regulation – an institutional infrastructure that regulates 
or guides historically-specific regimes of accumulation – is, of course, a sine qua non of 
RT. And the rise and decline of modes of regulation in capitalist history is, in turn, 
associated with the existence of long swings in the pace of growth and accumulation. So 
much is well known. But what if any counterpart to this analysis exists in PKE? In the 
first instance, aggregate fluctuations in PKE are traditionally associated with variations in 
the “state of long run expectations” (confidence, animal spirits etc.) that are, in turn, 
associated with decision making under uncertainty. These, moreover, are traditionally 
viewed as business cycle phenomenon. But many PK economists identify relatively 
enduring (but ultimately transmutable) institutions as part-and-parcel of the behavioural 
response to uncertainty, and these institutions are increasingly seen as contributing to 
longer phases of growth and retardation. For example, Crotty (1994) argues that 
institutions provide a source of “conditional stability” in a capitalist economy, without 
which uncertainty – or more specifically, flighty behavioural responses to uncertainty on 
the part of decision makers – would render the economy kaleidic. The examples that 
Crotty provides of institutions that create (or have created) this conditional stability 12 
 
include relatively long-lived arrangements, such as oligopolistic practices in product 
markets and the Bretton Woods system governing international finance. These examples 
are noteworthy because they are recognizable as two of the institutional structures that 
are found in RT accounts of the “Fordist” mode of regulation associated with the post-
war Golden Age (1948-73) of capitalist development. 
Elsewhere, Cornwall (1990), Cornwall and Cornwall (2001), and Cornwall and 
Setterfield (2002) appeal explicitly to the notion of an “institutional framework” to 
explain medium run “episodes” of macroeconomic performance during the twentieth 
century. Despite the objections of Cornwall and Cornwall (2001, chpt.5) noted earlier, the 
“institutional framework” is fundamentally similar to the idea of a mode of regulation, 
providing a sort of social “operating system” within the context of which basic economic 
functions (such as production and exchange) are undertaken. Meanwhile, Minsky’s 
maxim that “stability breeds instability” is increasingly understood by PK economists as 
referring to longer-term (rather than business cycle) dynamics, connected to the 
emergence and subsequent atrophy of financial sector institutions. For example, Wray 
(2009) argues that New Deal legislation and the rise of “big government” in the US gave 
rise to the post-war Golden Age, but that the financial stability associated with the latter 
encouraged the steady erosion of precisely those financial institutions on which the 
Golden Age was (in part) based, creating increasingly frequent and severe financial crises 
over the past 30 years. This process – which Wray has labelled the “Minsky half century” 
– gave rise to the emergence of a financially fragile “money manager capitalism” akin to 
the “finance capitalism” that preceded the Great Depression, and primed to fail in the 13 
 
manner witnessed in late 2008. Meanwhile, Palley (2009a) discusses a Minsky “super 
cycle” that  
works over a period of several business cycles and operates at the system level. 
The super cycle is a process of transforming business institutions, business 
conventions, and structures governing the market. These structures are critical for 
ensuring the stability of capitalist economies 
(Palley, 2009a, p.7) 
Moreover, the period of these Minsky super cycles is linked explicitly to what the author 
identifies as “the long cycle thinking of economists such as Schumpeter ... and 
Kondratieff” (Palley, 2009a, p.2). 
Finally, it can be argued that Institutionalist economists (implicitly) recognize the 
concept of institutions, as used in the “original” institutional economics associated with, 
inter alia, Thorsten Veblen, Clarence Ayres and John Dunlop, as an important “bridge” 
between RT and PKE. Hence while Hodgson (1989, 1999) discusses the links between 
institutionalism and PKE, the same author also acknowledges similarities between 
institutionalism and RT (see Labrousse and Vercueil, 2008). 
Of course, RT calls attention not just to the role of institutions but also that of 
technology in shaping capitalism – specifically, the technical (as well as social) character 
of the point of production, and the contribution this makes to defining regimes of 
accumulation. There is no obvious counterpart to this in PKE, where the 
microfoundations of macro analysis tend to focus more on pricing rules (and the 
distribution of income) than technical relations of production. It should be noted, 
however, that there is a rich emphasis on the dynamics of technical change in the 
Kaldorian branch of PKE. This extends to emphasizing the importance of sectoral 
differences in the capacity of the economy to generate productivity growth (Cornwall, 14 
 
1977; McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994, pp.164-6) – a theme that has also been explored in 
the RT tradition (see, for example, Petit 1986). 
 
4. Anticipations of the current crisis 
The thesis in this section is that there exist important commonalities as between RT 
and PKE anticipations of the current crisis in capitalist economies, and that these serve to 
exemplify the broad analytical similarities between the traditions identified in the 
previous section. Specifically, it is claimed that, while other accounts of contemporary 
conditions consistent with the basic strictures of either RT or PKE can certainly be 
entertained, a common theme in both traditions is that the current crisis represents the 
exhaustion of a financialized growth process. It is possible to show that, prior to the 
crisis, both: (a) the “financialized” and financially fragile character of the pre-2008 
growth process is clearly identified in both PKE and RT; and (b) the importance of real 
wage stagnation in driving household debt accumulation – the “ground zero” of 
contemporary financial fragility – is clearly identified in both traditions. 
 
i) A “financialized” growth regime subject to increasing financial fragility 
The RT literature prior to the 2008 financial crisis is replete with contributions 
that identify the then-contemporary growth regime as “financialized” and/or financially 
fragile (and therefore ripe for financial crisis).
7
                                                 
7 The term “financialization” is notoriously imprecise. It suffices for the purposes of this paper to appeal to 
Epstein’s (2005, p.3) broad definition of the phenomenon, according to which “financialization means the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies”. 
 For example, Lippit (1997) identifies the 
institutional development of the US financial sector during the 1980s and 1990s – 15 
 
including, but not limited to, financial sector deregulation and central bank policy rules – 
as enhancing an already well-developed venture capital industry, on which technology-
intensive start-up firms are heavily dependent. This, he argues, is particularly 
advantageous at a time of rapid technological change, and should therefore be regarded as 
one of the institutional pillars associated with a nascent long-wave upswing in the US 
economy dating from the early 1990s. Boyer (2000), meanwhile, develops a theoretical 
model of a financialized growth regime as a precursor to evaluating the possibility that 
such a regime has replaced the Fordist regime of accumulation characteristic of the 
Golden Age. Confronting the model with a variety of statistical indicators, he concludes 
that the model is best suited to a description of Anglo-Saxon economies, noting that the 
spread of financialization is less evident in Europe and Japan. Finally, Aglietta and 
Breton (2001) identify the increased importance of financial markets (rather than just 
information technology) as a defining feature of the “new economy”. They focus in 
particular on the prominence of the market for corporate control, arguing that this forces 
a norm of “shareholder value” on firms. As a result of this norm, firms must focus on 
distributing dividends at the expense of internally funding investment, the upshot being 
that their growth is retarded. 
  Other contributions to the RT tradition caution that financialization may de-
stabilize the growth process. Hence Boyer and Juillard (1998) argue that financial 
liberalization helped de-synchronize the post-war institutional architecture of the 
Japanese economy, and was thus an important contributor to the “lost decade” in Japan. 
Meanwhile, O’Hara (2002) argues that a successful financial social structure of 
accumulation (FSSA) must generate financial stability, conflict resolution between 16 
 
finance and industry, and sustainable productivity growth and profitability in the financial 
sector. He argues that the contemporary US FSSA generates none of these, and is 
therefore the Achilles heel of the growth process in the US. Both Aglietta (2000) and 
Boyer et al (2005) draw attention to the financial fragility inherent in a financialized 
growth regime. Finally, Guttmann (2007, p.2), writing at the very dawn of the crisis, 
anticipates that “what has transpired so far may well show this to have been the first 
systemic crisis of a new finance-led accumulation regime and as such an important stress 
test for an entire infrastructure of financial markets underpinning this regime”. He goes 
on to question numerous features of this regime – including the combination of 
previously separate financial activities within single firms, and the suitability of the 
regulatory framework – before alluding to the propensity of long periods of stability to 
breed financial fragility (citing Minsky in the process). Not surprisingly, the theme of 
financial fragility has also been pursued in contributions to the RT literature that have 
appeared since the onset of the crisis (see, for example, Kotz, 2009; Guttmann and 
Plihon, 2010). 
The PKE literature can justifiably claim to echo all of these same themes and 
concerns. This is perhaps not surprising, given the longstanding concern in PKE with the 
central roles of money and finance in the accumulation process. Hence Palley (1996, 
chpt.3) identifies endogenous money and finance as the “yin and yang” of accumulation 
and growth in PKE. While credit creation facilitates real expansion by relaxing the 
constraint on aggregate spending imposed by current income and previously accumulated 
wealth, the existence of liquid financial assets creates a potential “purchasing power 17 
 
sink” that can cause aggregate demand deficiencies, while debt accumulation can 
generate financial fragility and crisis a la Minsky.  
Against this backdrop, the period prior to the 2008 financial crisis witnessed a 
flourishing of PK models designed to investigate the impact of financialization on growth 
(see, for example, Stockhammer 2004, 2005-06; Lavoie, 2008; Skott and Ryoo 2008a, 
2008b). An important theme that emerges from this literature is the potentially 
ambiguous effects of financialization on growth in steady-state PK models. 
At the same time, the PKE literature produced numerous early warnings of 
growing financial fragility in the US and its potentially negative impact on 
macroeconomic performance. Perhaps the most celebrated of these are the Strategic 
Analyses produced by Wynne Godley and his various co-authors at the Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College (of which Godley and Izurieta (2002) is an excellent example). 
These track external, public sector and private sector balances in the US which, for any 
given level of income, must conform to the identity:
8
  private sector deficit ≡ public sector surplus – trade surplus 
 
Particular attention is focused on the evolution of household balance sheets – more 
specifically, the failure of households to de-leverage during and after the 2000-2001 
recession, and the mounting financial fragility of the US household sector thereafter. 
Similar warnings can be found in Palley (2002), who identifies household debt 
accumulation in the US as an unsustainable offset to a latent aggregate demand 
                                                 
8 This identity follows from the national income accounting identity: 
      I + G + X ≡ S + T + M 
where I denotes investment spending, G is government spending, X is exports, S denotes saving, T  is total 
tax revenues and M is imports (in other words, total injections are identically equal to total leakages). Re-
arranging this identity yields: 
      I – S ≡ (T – G) – (X – M) 
which is the identity stated in the main body of the paper. 18 
 
deficiency masking (but incapable of indefinitely forestalling) a severe crisis of demand 
in the US economy. 
  Again, it is not surprising to find that PKE analysis of the consequences of 
financialization and mounting financial fragility has continued in the wake of the 
financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession (see, for example, Hein and van Treeck 
(2010), and various of the papers published in the Cambridge Journal of Economics’ 
(volume 33, number 4, July 2009) special issue on the global financial crisis). 
 
ii) The demise of the Fordist wage labour nexus and household debt accumulation: the 
current crisis as a product of the previous crisis 
The notion that the post-war Golden Age was predicated on (inter alia) a Fordist 
“wage labour nexus” or “capital-labour accord” is a central feature of RT. But a similar 
claim can also be found in PKE, especially in the work of Cornwall (1990) and Cornwall 
and Cornwall (2001), who stress the importance of post-war “social bargains” in 
industrial relations for Golden Age macroeconomic outcomes. Moreover, and for the 
purposes of this paper, more importantly, the notion that the atrophy or breakdown of 
these arrangements since1973 has, in at least one fundamental sense, given rise to the 
current crisis, can be found in both the RT and PKE traditions. 
  The basic argument with which we are concerned here can be traced back to 
Marglin and Schor’s (1990) UNU-WIDER project.
9
                                                 
9 Although this project is not formally identified with RT, the publishers description of the book reads like 
a treatise in the RT tradition. Hence according to Oxford University Press, “blending historical analysis 
with economic theory, this work presents essays that scrutinize the institutions that fostered ... growth and 
high employment [during the Golden Age] as well as the forces which later undermined the effectiveness 
of these institutions in the 1960s and 70s” 
(
 In this book, Glyn et al (1990) – a 
www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Economics/History/?view=usa&ci=9780198287414). 19 
 
chapter co-authored by Alain Lipietz, one of the founders of RT – argue that the success 
of the post-war Golden Age was based, in part, on real wage growth keeping pace with 
productivity growth during the period 1945-73.
10
       
 This results in the roughly balanced 
growth of aggregate demand and “aggregate supply” (or more specifically, potential 
output), which is, in turn,  necessary for the maintenance of a constant rate of 
employment and hence for the sustainability of a long run equilibrium rate of growth that 
is demand-determined. To see this, first note that, as was demonstrated earlier in footnote 
3, in order for the employment rate to remain constant – which it must in the steady state 
– we need to observe: 
p yy =  
Now consider the following simple static characterization of an economy in which output 
is demand-determined: 
        AD C A = +            [19] 
        Y AD =             [20] 






=             [21] 
where AD denotes aggregate demand, C and A denote consumption and non-consumption 
expenditures, respectively, Y and Yp denote (respectively) actual and potential output, and 
L is the size of the labour force (all variables are in real terms). Substituting [19] into [20] 
and converting both the resulting equation and equation [21] into growth rates, we arrive 
at: 
                                                 
10 Again, while the authors do not explicitly identify their contribution with the RT tradition, the 
connections are obvious. Hence in the introduction to their chapter, Glyn et al (1990, pp.39-41) describe 
theirs as a historical approach that identifies the Golden Age as a unique “economic regime” founded on a 
particular “macroeconomic structure” and “system of production” (by-words for the regime of 
accumulation) and “rules of co-ordination” (which correspond to the institutions typically emphasized in 
RT as constituents of the post-war mode of regulation). 20 
 
      ˆˆ (1 ) cc yC A ωω = +−             [22] 
and: 
      p y qn = +              [23] 
Finally, equating y and yp to reveal the conditions under which we will observe a constant 
rate of employment, we arrive at: 
      ˆˆ (1 ) cc C Aqn ωω +− =+          [24] 
where ωc is the share of consumption in total expenditures. 
Now suppose that: 
      w C c wN c D π = + Π+  
where w is the real wage, N is total employment, П is total profit, D is debt-financed 
consumption spending by wage earners and cw and cπ represent the (constant) 
propensities to consume of wage and profit earners, respectively. Assuming that 
01 w cc π =<< , this expression can be re-written as: 
      w
N
C cw L D
L
= +  
where N/ L denotes the employment rate. Assuming that N/L remains constant, it 
therefore follows that: 
      ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) YY C wn D ωω = + +−          [25] 
where ωY denotes the share of total consumption spending that is funded by current 
income. Substituting [25] into [24] and re-arranging yields: 
 
      ˆ ˆ ˆ [ (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 ) c Y Y c cY w D Aq n ω ω ω ω ωω +− +− =+−     [26] 21 
 
 
If we now assume that D grows at the same rate as wage income – which is necessary to 
keep the debt: income ratio of working households constant over time – we can write: 
        ˆ ˆ Dwn = +  
and substituting this expression into equation [22], we arrive at: 
      ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) cc c w Aq n ωω ω +− =+−         [27] 
It is now obvious by inspection that as  1 c ω → , the expression in [23] reduces to: 
        ˆ wq =               [27a] 
(Recall that, historically in the US,  0.66 c ω ≈ ; currently,  0.70 c ω ≈ .) 
Putting the pieces of this analysis together, we can now see that equality in the rates 
of growth of real wages and labour productivity will more or less suffice to keep total 
expenditures and potential output – or “aggregate demand and aggregate supply” – 
growing at the same rate, which, when the actual rate of growth is demand-determined, is 
necessary to keep the employment rate constant. In simple terms, the equality of real 
wage growth and labour productivity growth can be thought of as a “golden rule” for 
sustainable growth consistent with full (or even simply a constant rate of) employment. 
  As previously noted, Glyn et al (1990) argue that this “golden rule” was actually 
observed during the post war Golden Age and, for the reasons outlined above, was 
instrumental in the macroeconomic success of this era. Hence: 22 
 
The balance between the growth of real wages and productivity allows 
consumption to grow roughly in line with production. Between 1952 and 1970 the 
private consumption of the ACCs [advanced capitalist countries] rose by 4.2 per 
cent p.a. whilst production rose by 4.5 per cent. A fundamentally new 
development of the post-war period was that the massive growth in production 
was counterbalanced by an equal growth of consumption ... extending to all 
sectors of the population but first and foremost to wage-earners. 
(Glyn et al, 1990, pp.49-50) 
 
The analysis in Glyn et al (1990) ends in 1979, by which time, the authors argue, we 
had witnessed an end to “attempts to breathe life back into the golden age economic 
regime” (Glyn et al, 1990, p.40). But as a matter of logic, it follows from the preceding 
analysis that if real wages grow slower than productivity growth, the “golden rule” for 
sustainable growth consistent with a constant rate of employment is violated: other things 
being equal, the economy is primed for sluggish output growth and steadily rising 
unemployment. It is precisely this violation of the “golden rule” that Petit’s (1999, 
pp.223-6) growth accounting identifies with the post-Fordist era (which he dates from the 
mid-1980s). Hence according to Petit, growth since the mid-1980s has been characterized 
by slow (but positive) productivity growth coupled with stagnant real wages, consistent 
with a declining wage share of income.
11
                                                 
11 Note that the wage share of income, ωW, is given by: 
 Kotz (2008, p.175), meanwhile, argues that the 
neoliberal era (which he dates to circa 1980) is characterized by “a contradiction between 
the conditions for creation of surplus value and those necessary for its realization” 
because “stagnating wages creates a potential problem of overproduction relative to 
        W
wN
Y
ω =  
which implies that: 
        ˆ ( )0 WW wq ωω = −<   
if: 
        ˆ wq <  
(given ωW >> 0). In other words, the wage share will decline – as observed by Petit (1999) – if real wage 
growth falls short of productivity growth. 23 
 
demand”. He goes on to connect the failure of this problem to materialize to household 
debt accumulation, before warning that this latter process may have reached its limit. 
Exactly the same arguments are prominent in PKE anticipations and analyses of the 
fundamental causes of the current crises. In simplified form, the PKE argument runs as 
follows. Since the late 1970s, real wages have grown at a slower pace than productivity 
in advanced capitalist economies, thus creating a latent aggregate demand deficiency. 
The latter did not immediately become manifest, however, because households seeking 
increases in their standard of living resorted to debt accumulation to finance increasing 
consumption expenditures that could not be funded by rising real income – thus filling 
the aggregate demand gap that would have otherwise resulted from real wage growth 
lagging productivity growth.
12
The argument outlined above is exemplified by Palley (2002), who explicitly 
connects real wage stagnation and household debt accumulation, identifying the latter as 
a “temporary offset” to the aggregate demand problems caused by the former which (as 
 But the same process of household debt accumulation 
resulted in increasing household debt to income ratios and debt-servicing burdens. In 
other words, the process was ultimately unsustainable: growth based on the debt-financed 
expansion of consumption expenditures by households experiencing little or no growth in 
real incomes must eventually grind to a halt – and according to PKE, has since 2008. 
                                                 
12 Household debt accumulation can be seen as the “American solution” to the aggregate demand 
deficiency identified above. Other economies – most notably Germany and Japan amongst the advanced 
capitalist countries – pursued export-led growth to offset deficiencies in the size of their domestic markets. 
But the latter was facilitated to a substantial degree by the willingness of the US to act as a “consumer of 
last resort” for foreign goods – as reflected in the substantial size of the US trade deficit over the last thirty 
years. In short, the “American solution” turns out to have been a “global solution,” thus justifying the focus 
on US household debt accumulation in the PKE analysis described above (although the preceding analysis 
does also call attention to the existence of important global imbalances associated with the resulting growth 
regime). 24 
 
the label suggests) cannot be sustained.
13
  If – as both the RT and PKE literatures suggests – the violation of the “golden 
rule” since the late 1970s marks both a departure from the conditions prevalent during the 
Golden Age and a fundamental cause of the current crisis, then why did this transition 
occur? On this theme, the RT and PKE literatures again speak with one voice, suggesting 
that the breakdown of the industrial relations described at the start of this section were 
primarily responsible.
 Not surprisingly, the PKE literature has been 
replete with references to the real wage stagnation/unsustainable debt accumulation 
dynamic since the advent of the Great Recession (see, for example, Palley 2009b, 2010; 
Setterfield 2010b). 
14
                                                 
13 See also Godley and Izurieta (2002) and Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) on the links between US 
household debt accumulation and consumption expenditure, and the unsustainability of the former. 
 Hence Glyn et al (1990, p.58) argue that the “golden rule” was 
“embedded in the particular institutions of the wage-determination process” (p.58) during 
the Golden Age, including collective bargaining with unionized workers and minimum 
wage regulations, which together assisted the spread of wage norms established in 
unionized sectors to non-unionized sectors of the workforce. They then emphasize the 
breakdown of these institutions amid the strike and wage explosions of late 1960s/early 
1970s as resulting in the initial violation of the “golden rule”, resulting in real wage 
growth that exceeded productivity growth (and hence precipitated the onset of a profit 
squeeze). Kotz (2008), meanwhile, associates the subsequent (post 1980) neoliberal 
growth regime – in which productivity growth exceeded real wage growth – as resulting 
from the demise of the “regulationist” institutional structure characteristic of the golden 
  In addition to household debt accumulation, Palley (2002) identifies a number of other “temporary 
offsets” – including, but not limited to, wealth and expectational effects associated with asset price bubbles 
– responsible for keeping US aggregate demand buoyant during thirty years of real wage stagnation. 
14 The breakdown of these arrangements is a theme that is well rehearsed in the RT literature. But it is also 
prominent in certain branches of PKE analysis. See, for example, Cornwall (1990), Cornwall and Cornwall 
(2001) and Setterfield (2006, 2007). 25 
 
age and its replacement by neoliberal institutions that (inter alia) weakened the 
bargaining power of labour. In very much the same vein, Palley (2002) identifies 
“business dominated labour markets” as one of the causes of America’s unsustainable 
growth path since 1980, arguing that “remedying this calls for rebuilding the institutions 
that gird the labor market, including the minimum wage and union density” (p.30). And once 
again, these themes have been echoed in post-crisis PKE analysis (see, for example, 
Setterfield 2010b). 
  In short, it is possible to identify contributions to both the RT and PKE traditions 
that anticipate the current crisis as arising from essentially the same source: an imbalance 
in the aggregate demand generating process associated, in the first instance, with the 
failure of real wage growth to keep pace with that of productivity, and explained 
ultimately by the atrophy of a system of industrial relations specific to the post-war 
Golden Age. The fact that RT and PKE are capable of furnishing such compatible 
accounts of the events of the last six decades only enhances the claims made in the 
previous section regarding their broad analytical congruity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
It is often remarked that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. Much the same may 
ultimately be said about one’s sense as to whether there are more similarities than 
differences between RT and PKE. But the argument that has been advanced in this paper 
is that, certain genuine differences between these traditions notwithstanding, there are 
real and important analytical similarities between RT and PKE. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that anticipations of the current crisis in both RT and PKE bear out the thesis that 
there is much in common between these traditions. There are branches of both literatures 26 
 
that identify the same structural flaw in the post-1980 growth regime (productivity 
growth in excess of real wage growth) as the ultimate progenitor of the crisis, and which 
explain the emergence of this flaw in similar fashion (institutional change that upset a 
previously existing balance in the dynamics of aggregate wage formation). Ultimately, 
then, it seems fitting to close by quoting Foley and Michl (2010, p.56), whose final 
appraisal of the Classical and Keynesian traditions in growth theory serves as an equally 
fitting assessment of the relationship between RT and PKE: 
it is tempting to conclude that the disagreements that remain chart a common 
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